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Introduction
Is not the setting up of a neutral institution standing between the 
people and its enemies, capable of establishing the dividing line 
between the true and the false, the guilty and the innocent, the just 
and the unjust, is this not a way of resisting popular justice? A way 
of disarming it in the struggle it is conducting in reality in favor of 
an arbitration in the realm of the ideal? This is why I am wondering 
whether the court is not a form of popular justice but rather its 
deformation.
— Michel Foucault, “On Popular Justice: A Discussion  
with Maoists,” February 1972
Before the testimonies begin, I would like to briefly address as 
straightforwardly as I can a few questions that have been raised 
about this tribunal. The first is that this tribunal is a kangaroo 
court. That it represents only one point of view. That it is a 
prosecution without a defense. That the verdict is a foregone 
conclusion. . . .  Let me say categorically that this tribunal is the 
defense. It is an act of resistance in itself. 
— Arundhati Roy, “Opening Speech on Behalf of the Jury  
of Conscience of the World Tribunal on Iraq,” June 2005
It was February 15, 2003. Millions of people around the world were demon-
strating against the war the United States, the United Kingdom, and their al-
lies were planning to wage in Iraq. Marching in New York City, I was one of 
them. Despite the largest protest in human history,1 the war on Iraq began 
rapidly on March 19, 2003. That summer, I was twenty- three. I recall the night 
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I was first told about the World Tribunal on Iraq, yet to be named. It was in 
Istanbul. Three women— two friends in their forties, a translator, a publisher, 
along with a graduate student in her early twenties— asked me to participate 
in an international effort, which they described with palpable passion. 
Numerous individuals and groups active in the global antiwar movement, 
the women said, were planning to put the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and their allies on trial for crimes committed during the invasion and occu-
pation of Iraq. If official institutions of international law failed to act, they 
declared, then global civil society had the right and the duty to form its own 
tribunal to tell and disseminate the truth about the Iraq War. As the novelist 
John Berger had asserted of the need to found such a tribunal, “the records 
have to be kept and, by definition, the perpetrators, far from keeping records, 
try to destroy them.” Someone had to chronicle the untold death and destruc-
tion that the war would bring. Someone had to record the great opposition to 
this war, “so that the accusations become unforgettable, and proverbial on 
every continent,” Berger had said.2 For this daunting task, these three women 
had volunteered themselves. 
That summer night, they asked me if I had heard of the Russell Tribunal 
on Vietnam.3 I hadn’t. They asked me if I would return to New York City, 
where I was doctoral student at Columbia University, to help organize a tri-
bunal on Iraq there. Many tribunal sessions would occur around the world 
and culminate with a final event in Istanbul, they explained. I was astonished 
by the enormity of the effort, by its daring ambition, the commitment, the 
time and the labor it would demand. I was provoked by the questions it raised. 
Who were we? And who were we to constitute such a tribunal on Iraq? Would 
we act critically in the face of international law or endorse its pretensions? 
Could the tribunal become grassroots in character? And what would this tri-
bunal look like, what language would it speak? 
* * *
It was June 27, 2005, about seven o’clock in the morning. From the roof terrace 
of the Armada Hotel, overlooking the Golden Horn and the Blue Mosque of 
Istanbul, I could observe satellite- broadcasting trucks lining the street below. 
Soon, the World Tribunal on Iraq was to hold a press conference to present its 
judgment and declaration. At that very moment, the text of the declaration 
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(drafted in English) was passing from the hands of one translator to the next.4 
The novelist Arundhati Roy, spokesperson of the tribunal’s Jury of Con-
science, would, in a few hours, lead the way into the hotel’s conference room, 
accompanied by thunderous applause and slogans echoing in multiple lan-
guages. Two hundred journalists, international and local observers, and doz-
ens of cameras and recorders had packed the room beyond limits. Several of 
these journalists would see their names just below the headlines of their news-
papers the next morning, as “the news” would break in large and bold letters 
on the front page: “Tribunal of Conscience Declared Its Judgment: Bush and 
Blair, Guilty.”5 
The story I tell in For the Love of Humanity is based on two years of field-
work with the transnational network of antiwar activists who created the 
World Tribunal on Iraq (WTI) from the autumn of 2003 through the summer 
of 2005 in some twenty cities around the world. I was a “participant observer” 
during the conceptualization and practical formation of the WTI, committed 
as an activist and anthropologist at once.6 The antiwar activists I worked 
Figure 1. “Tribunal of Conscience Declared Its Judgment: Bush and Blair Guilty,” 
Akşam, June 28, 2005. Photo by the author.
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with— hundreds of them living continents apart— were lawyers, journalists, 
scholars, NGO workers, students, musicians, translators, scientists, editors, 
artists, filmmakers, writers, teachers, and the unemployed. They belonged to 
three different generations and spoke in English— and in Turkish, Arabic, 
Danish, French, Flemish, Dutch, Japanese, Korean, Hindi, Urdu, Malayalam, 
Italian, German, Spanish, Portuguese, Hebrew, Swedish— with each other.
In the absence of official institutions of justice willing or able to perform 
this task, the World Tribunal on Iraq established a transnational platform 
where the war on Iraq could be publicly judged. The WTI’s ultimate session 
in Istanbul became a global public event, receiving considerable media atten-
tion throughout the Middle East and “alternative media” coverage worldwide.7 
Its proceedings were later published as two separate books in Turkish and in 
English,8 while a number of documentaries preserve for the record other pub-
lic hearings produced by the tribunal over its two- year existence.9
Within the tradition of “civil society tribunals,” the World Tribunal on Iraq 
was unprecedented in its global scale, scope, structure, and sophistication.10 
Founded with the principal purpose “to tell and disseminate the truth about 
the Iraq war”11 and to create an alternative historical record of Iraq’s occupa-
tion, including the worldwide resistance to it, the WTI was produced through 
a decentralized, nonhierarchical network of transcontinental cooperation. In 
this important respect, namely its organizational form, the WTI was excep-
tional within the tradition of civil society tribunals. 
Before Istanbul, the WTI network had conducted numerous sessions 
around the world and registered untold violations committed by the occupy-
ing forces in Iraq. While diverse in process and procedure, hearings associated 
with the WTI were organized in Barcelona, Brussels, Copenhagen, Frankfurt, 
Genoa, Istanbul, Lisbon, London, Mumbai, New York, Rome, Seoul, Stock-
holm, and several cities in Japan.12 In this way, the WTI constructed a globally 
networked stage where the consequences of Iraq’s occupation were demon-
strated. During the tribunal, countless testimonies were offered by eyewit-
nesses to the invasion and occupation of Iraq, by international lawyers arguing 
that the war on Iraq was illegal, and by many journalists, scholars, and activ-
ists who all documented, contested, and often protested the reasons and con-
sequences of Iraq’s occupation.
I was particularly active during the many months of preparation for the 
World Tribunal on Iraq’s early session in New York City (May 2004) and for 
its final session in Istanbul (June 2005). Participating in the conduct of mul-
tiple tribunal hearings and meetings in six different cities— Brussels, Paris, 
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Kyoto, Mumbai, New York, and Istanbul— allowed me to analyze the commit-
ments and tensions animating the WTI’s laborious cosmopolitics. It is on the 
basis of this intimate engagement with the WTI that I offer critical reflections 
on the tribunal’s (and my own) praxis of transnational solidarity over two 
crucial years. 
The World Tribunal on Iraq activists confronted many dilemmas during 
those intense years of political debate and action, which they negotiated in the 
context of a comparable politics of human rights and international law con-
currently enacted by institutions that did not (unlike themselves) wave the 
flag of anti- imperialism. To address this predicament, I examine as well Am-
nesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Iraqi High Tribunal in the 
context of Iraq’s occupation. Engaging in this wider analysis allows me to 
present a stronger argument for our pressing need to reevaluate, ever more 
critically, the relationship between law and violence, empire and human 
rights, cosmopolitan authority and political autonomy. To this end, I demon-
strate how and why a potent critique of the politics of human rights and in-
ternational law must rethink the legal distribution of violence globally and 
reconsider the proper commitments of internationalism, including its dedi-
cation to political autonomy. 
The World Tribunal on Iraq remains a seminal exercise in transnational 
solidarity and political philosophy. So I convey the complexities attending its 
praxis, including the tribunal’s global form of organization as an open net-
work that functioned horizontally. Thinking alongside key jurists, theorists, 
and critics of global democracy, I situate disagreements among WTI activists 
philosophically, politically, and historically and demonstrate how they exem-
plify well the impasses of a transnational politics of human rights with anti- 
imperialist commitments. These impasses are particularly difficult to resolve 
when they concern the virtues of self- determination— that is, the problem of 
autonomy— in relation to the violent universalism of an international law that 
attempts to govern humanity with the promise of peace and justice.
Methodologically, I enact a model of scholarship that combines ethno-
graphic work on global political action with close readings in political theory. 
The WTI’s praxis was provocative on several counts. I approach the global 
constitution of the WTI by hundreds of persons and organizations embedded 
in national and local antiwar movements as fertile ground to explore the par-
adoxical politics of human rights and international law at the turn of the 
twenty- first century. The context is the thorny geography of cosmopolitics, on 
whose grounds, wars, occupations, and antiwar movements alike are waged 
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through the language of human rights and international law, in the name of 
freedom, liberation, and democracy. 
I explore situations where the language of human rights and international 
law is particularly able to bear what political theorist Nancy Fraser defines as 
“discourses of abnormal justice.”13 According to Fraser, discourses of abnor-
mal justice reflect the destabilization of a prior hegemonic grammar, whereby 
the what, the who, and the how of justice become subject, at once, to substan-
tive debate.14 To date, there is hardly a more revealing global case of “abnormal 
justice”— a legitimation crisis, in the lexicon of Jürgen Habermas— than that 
evidenced by the occupation of Iraq. In that moment of crisis recognized and 
augmented by forces of anti- occupation resistance worldwide, particularly in 
Iraq, WTI organizers produced public debate on the what, the who, the how, 
as well as, I add, the why of justice.15 On a globally networked stage, the World 
Tribunal on Iraq placed the grammar of global justice at stake. 
Through a detailed analysis of the WTI, I interrogate cosmopolitan poli-
tics occasioned by the occupation of Iraq to examine the antinomies of this 
politics for establishing a theoretically grounded understanding of its lasting 
dilemmas and persistent dangers. In particular, I demonstrate how and why 
ideals of human rights and international law become entangled with the vio-
lence of imperial practices. The growing hegemony of a cosmopolitanism that 
can endorse the use of violence by many means— in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, 
and Syria to offer a few examples— because it is dedicated to the idea of peace, 
renders the paradoxes I pursue all the more relevant as they continue to inflect 
and inform global politics. 
While in most of the book I focus on cases of disagreement within the 
WTI network, I hereby aim to reveal how they reflect competing understand-
ings of justice, legitimacy, and authority imagined in response to the occupa-
tion of Iraq. But also, along the lines of Richard Falk— jurist of international 
law, theorist of cosmopolitan democracy, and spokesperson of the Panel of 
Advocates at the WTI’s final session in Istanbul— I consider the translingual, 
transgenerational, transcontinental, transformative travail that was the WTI 
as “an experiment from the perspective of achieving global democracy.”16 If 
the result of this experimental demonstration is an agonistic, yet dialogical 
polyphony, this, I suggest, is a symptom of a crisis afflicting what Carl Schmitt 
called “the nomos of the earth,”17 the principle of legitimacy orienting the 
world. More specifically, the cosmopolitical dilemmas I examine expose, left 
and right, a limit afflicting the democratic idea since its inception: the limit 
between the universality of principles posed within the horizon of humanity 
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and the particularity of autonomies of decision constituted in the form of 
popular sovereignty.18 
Consequential for the inquiry offered throughout this book is the decision 
to posit on a single plane of consideration the cosmopolitics of the WTI net-
work and the cosmopolitan principles that affirmed the constitution of a dem-
ocratic Iraq before or after the fact of its occupation. I thereby highlight 
revealing commonalities between the two sides of the war of legitimacy over 
Iraq’s occupation: those who proposed and those who opposed it. I remain 
convinced that implicit commonalities and convergences between adversarial 
camps are as telling as explicit disagreements and divergences. 
As foreseen by Jacques Derrida in an interview reflecting on the World 
Tribunal on Iraq, the debates I narrate were underwritten by a crisis in which 
WTI activists were not “able to avoid talking about sovereignty, about the 
crisis of sovereignty.”19 I suspect this crisis is not unrelated to a core question 
that orients the thoughts to follow: why do we care about justice, about the 
freedom and the happiness, the life and the death of each other, here and 
there? An answer offered by the World Tribunal on Iraq could be: for the love 
of humanity. 
* * *
In May 2003 two philosophers— Habermas and Derrida— published a joint 
appeal in two prominent German and French dailies of the liberal Left.20 If not 
a philosophical one, between the two a “tactical alliance” was forged to ad-
dress, exclusively, the European public sphere. The spectacular event of inspi-
ration was the global demonstrations of February 15 against the impending 
war. Selectively reflecting on the day’s manifestation in “the core of Europe,” 
however, Habermas and Derrida read this day to assert a European identity 
in the singular, coupling it with the hope for a global domestic policy that 
would “defend and promote a cosmopolitan order on the basis of interna-
tional law.”21
The same May in Jakarta, hundreds of activists who had helped organize 
the February 15 protests composed the “Jakarta Consensus” and addressed a 
global public in the singular.22 There, empowered by the demonstration of 
their own power around the world in February,23 and despite the beginning of 
the war in March, elements of a global antiwar constituency arrived at several 
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strategic decisions. For one, the idea of “holding a war crimes tribunal was 
endorsed as among the must- do tasks of the movement.”24 The following 
month in June, the task was already assumed in other gatherings of the global 
antiwar movement in Berlin, Brussels, Cancun, Geneva, and Paris: those who 
were separately yet simultaneously inspired to constitute a civil society tribu-
nal had begun to connect and coordinate with one another.25 
“First, I would like to tell you that I am not going to give my testimony in 
English, because it is the language of the occupiers.”26 With this sentence pro-
nounced in Arabic before some five hundred people in the audience— and 
countless others witnessing her testimony live on the radio, television, and 
Internet through simultaneous translation in Turkish and English— Nermin 
al- Mufti began her testimony before the WTI’s final session in Istanbul. Al- 
Mufti’s testimony was one among fifty- four presentations delivered by a Panel 
of Advocates and witnesses before a Jury of Conscience from across the 
world.27 Considering “the problem of global justice,”28 what is the significance 
of this testimony from Iraq, which asserted “the Occupation as Prison”?29 
What is the meaning of the myriad cases made before the WTI by lawyers, 
scholars, and activists to evidence the illegality and the illegitimacy of the 
occupation of Iraq? And what status could be claimed for the World Tribunal 
on Iraq itself— according to which geography of legitimacy, which global jus-
tice, law, or society? 
Writing for Le Monde Diplomatique, Richard Falk argues, “In the absence 
of formal action on accountability, such informal initiatives [as the WTI] fill 
a legal vacuum, at least symbolically, and give legitimacy to non- violent anti- 
war undertakings.”30 Elsewhere, dedicating a chapter of his book to the WTI, 
Falk reiterates his jurisprudential rationale for the tribunal, appraising that its 
“claim of authority is to some extent ex nihil— that is without constitutional 
or positive law foundations. It rests on an ethos of concern and responsibility 
for fundamental law and morality . . .  expressive of the impulse to feel, think 
and act as a global citizen in an increasingly globalizing world.”31 Nonetheless, 
when it comes to claims of global authority, cross- examination reveals crucial 
convergences between the two sides of what Falk calls “the legitimacy war that 
often ends up shaping the political outcome more than battlefield results.”32 
For one, how can the cosmopolitan ethos of concern and responsibility pred-
icating the legitimacy of the WTI be distinguished from the cosmopolitan 
ethos that conferred legitimacy, ex ante or ex post facto, to the constitution of 
a “liberated” Iraq?33 In the rest of the book, I reflect on this question by exam-
ining foundational and consequential debates among WTI activists, including 
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disagreements on the “sources” of the tribunal’s own authority and 
legitimacy. 
Before proceeding with this analysis, however, I should observe that the 
tensions and difficulties of distinction I examine here emerge in various re-
lated contexts and cases. First and foremost, they attend any attempt to criti-
cally address the paradox that the war on Iraq, as well as its occupation, were 
at once opposed and proposed in the name of universal human rights. In 
addressing this situation, many scholars, including some of those involved in 
the WTI processes, have asserted the abuse, the hijack,34 or the instrumental-
ization35 of human rights ideals and cosmopolitan dispositions by those pur-
suing a distinctly imperial project. Thus, evaluating the rhetoric that 
legitimated the invasion of Iraq, a cosmopolitan sociologist concludes, “this 
was undoubtedly a hollow, cynical and opportunistic appropriation of human 
rights discourse emptied of all substantive content.”36 Rarely with exceptions, 
the promulgators of what I call the instrumentalization thesis proceed to af-
firm, in contrast, the authenticity of their own commitment to human rights 
and cosmopolitan solidarity. On the other hand, while some intellectuals of 
the Left dismiss the discourse of human rights as such, precisely on account 
of its propensity to be used as a justification for imperialist ventures,37 others 
have insisted along with Derrida that “we must [il faut] more than ever stand 
on the side of human rights.”38
I argue that in cases made through the instrumentalization thesis, neither 
the reasons nor the consequences of the particular vitality of the cosmopoli-
tan ethos of human rights in justifying imperial war and occupation emerge 
as proper subjects of interrogation. If evidence were needed of this vitality, 
one could turn to passionate arguments reasoned in support of Iraq’s occupa-
tion “by those of liberal disposition who wrestled with their consciences and 
took a stand in support of the liberation of Iraq.”39 In fact, analyzing the dem-
ocratic reasoning of the occupation forces, Samera Esmeir, a legal scholar, is 
correct in arguing that “the war on Iraq was carried out for the law, the specific 
law of juridico- democracy.”40 The conclusion must also be drawn with her that 
this “rhetoric” of democracy, rule of law, liberation, and human rights needs 
to be interrogated on its own terms. For her part, Esmeir considers how the 
promised nonviolence of juridico- democracy operated as an ideal that pro-
duced the occupation’s violence in Iraq. What I wish to highlight instead are 
the dispositions, ethos, and commitments of cosmopolitanism, which the 
promise of democracy mobilized to legitimate Iraq’s occupation. I am con-
cerned, in other words, with the cosmopolitan commitments rallied by the 
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revolutionary attempt of the George W. Bush administration, its ancestors, 
and heirs “to impose political democracy through military force and to use 
democratization as the ideological arm of a neoimperial project.”41 
In a situation where “the continuous slide of cosmopolitan ideas  towards 
empire is one of the dominant motifs of modernity,” as critical theorist of in-
ternational law Costas Douzinas asserts, the insufficiency of the instrumen-
talization thesis as a form of critique is particularly consequential.42 It is with 
acute awareness of this historical context that I insist: posing the problem as 
one of insincere instrumentalization of otherwise unproblematic ideals oc-
cludes confronting the constitutive entanglement of cosmopolitanism— 
 including its assertions of humanitarian responsibility and care, and 
promotions of human rights and democracy everywhere— with imperial 
practices. The universal ideals of cosmopolitanism, in other words, are not 
merely the ruse of imperial politics. Their relationship, often mediated by vi-
olence, is more intimate and complex than the instrumentalization thesis 
suggests.
Political theorist Andrew Arato discusses such an entanglement in his 
essay “Empire’s Democracy, Ours and Theirs,” in which he explicitly delimits 
us to “all those to whom the norms and values of democracy, human rights, 
civil society and the public sphere remain the unsurpassable ideals of the pres-
ent historical epoch.”43 Building his argument, Arato first observes that the 
language of democracy and human rights, performing within the motif of 
democratic regime change, replaced the threat of weapons of mass destruc-
tion as the primary logic justifying the war on Iraq. Second, he asserts that 
even if democracy and human rights may not have been “the real reasons” 
underpinning Iraq’s occupation, once in operation as an ideology of justifica-
tion, they carry their own particular force. I further contend that in cases of 
“occupation for liberation,”44 the claim that ideals of human rights are insin-
cerely instrumentalized cannot fully counter the ideological force of human- 
rights- based justifications of occupation. This is especially the case, in Arato’s 
designation, “when people suffer from dictatorship.”45 
Thus, even if the United States administration may not have been truthful 
in its justification of the war and occupation as serving to foster human rights 
in Iraq, to the extent that “we” were interested in the latter end, this justifica-
tion’s power over “us” remained in force. Arato manifests the stakes of this 
power when he claims: “it seems undeniable that in the midst of all that was 
wrong with the war, the overthrow of the Saddam regime and the freeing of 
political energies in Iraq were, (very) abstractly considered, a good thing.”46 
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And the difficulty, (very) concretely considered, arose to the extent that the 
intended or unintended democratic effect of the war on Iraq, both as promise 
and as consequence, was itself desirable for “us.” How to draw a line then, 
between what Arato calls “the imperial democratization project and ours”?47 
What is this democracy, and who were “we”? 
If the effective ends of imperial practices (say, the overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein in Iraq or Bashar al- Assad in Syria) and the desired ends for “us” 
potentially correspond, what is the difference between “the imperial democ-
ratization project and ours” beyond an occasional dispute over the proper 
means? This question is unperturbed by the finding that “in reality” the results 
of empire’s interventions turn(ed) out to be undemocratic. To the extent that 
desire and support for intervention precede the realization or failure of its 
promise, the anticipated result, the expectation of its realization already con-
figures the substance of the promise as an effective force now— actualizing the 
promise “to deliver human rights” as an effective reality in the present. 
Thus, in order to articulate with clarity the difference, if any, between “the 
imperial democratization project and ours,” it is necessary that the potential 
congruence of effective ends between adversarial camps be affirmed rather 
than negated (especially in principle). Along with the anthropologist Talal 
Asad who argues, “motives in general are more complicated than is popularly 
supposed and . . .  the assumption that they are truths to be accessed is mis-
taken,”48 I suggest that it may be necessary to bracket the problem of “true 
motivation” in cases of war and occupation legitimated in the name of human 
rights, as in Iraq. Not because “ulterior” motives are lacking, but because it is 
especially revealing to evaluate the promise to deliver human rights on its own 
terms. 
Political theorist Wendy Brown is a rare scholar of the Left who has not 
hesitated, at least in passing, to signal this need. Considering Donald Rums-
feld’s declaration in 2002 that “the War on Terror is a war for human rights,” 
she finds: “It is not only that Rumsfeld has co- opted the language of human 
rights for imperialist aims abroad and antidemocratic ones at home, but that 
insofar as the ‘liberation’ of Afghanistan and Iraq promised to deliver human 
rights to those oppressed populations, it is hard both to parse cynical from 
sincere deployments of human rights discourse and to separate human rights 
campaigns from legitimating liberal imperialism.”49 What accounts for the 
posited difficulty of distinguishing the sincere from the cynical here, if not 
what remains implicit in Brown’s formulation, namely, the very possibility 
that the promise to deliver human rights may in fact be fulfilled by liberal 
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imperialism? It is in the context of this troubling possibility that For the Love of 
Humanity: The World Tribunal on Iraq provides an ethnographically grounded, 
critical analysis of the politics of human rights, international law, and cosmo-
politanism in the early twenty- first century. This troubling possibility is also 
why among the primary concerns of this book are the vectors of convergence 
and divergence between imperial mobilizations of international law, human 
rights, and ideas of humanity on the one side and anti- imperial ones on the 
other.
* * *
Years after the conclusion of the World Tribunal on Iraq, an important ques-
tion remains: What is the enduring significance of the WTI today? First of all, 
we can expect the tribunal form itself to be continually mobilized by activists 
in local and global politics. Today, from the Russell Tribunal on Palestine to 
the Tribunal 12 on migrant rights in Europe, we see proliferating examples of 
political action that assume the form of a public tribunal. Because the World 
Tribunal on Iraq was a conscious experiment with the tribunal form itself— 
 deconstructing its own employment of this form in the very act of making use 
of it— its example is of particular relevance for activists and scholars who may 
wish to mobilize, develop, or critique the tribunal form in the present and 
future.
Further, neither the language of human rights and international law nor 
the eagerness to engage in practices of transnational solidarity is leaving the 
scene of global politics. If anything, given persistent calls for humanitarian 
intervention (in Syria, to name one example) and the emergence of various 
uprisings around the world, human rights and international law are only gain-
ing further currency as the lingua franca of global politics and transnational 
solidarity. As the perplexities of liberal thought and practice negotiated by 
WTI activists on the battlefield of cosmopolitics remain in place, two intense 
years of political action offer tested strategies for navigating a global terrain of 
struggle saturated with the language of human rights and international law— a 
language that is spoken, all too often, without adequate reflection. It is in this 
context that the praxis of the World Tribunal of Iraq remains provocative 
because of its elaborate and creative engagement with the grammar of this 
language of global peace and justice. 
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Ultimately, through an analysis of the World Tribunal on Iraq, I probe the 
paradoxes, perplexities, and the potentials of this transnational praxis in order 
to clarify, as far as currently possible, the political, legal, and philosophical 
problems posed by the “liberation” of Iraq by the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and their allies. And I do so by challenging the constraints of con-
temporary liberal thought. In fact, For the Love of Humanity does not shy 
away from exploring how and why— and with what perverse effects— politics 
is articulated in the name of humanity, its rights, and its laws in the twenty- 
first century. 
With this aim, each chapter explores the language of political action spo-
ken by WTI activists and their adversaries. Chapter 1, “Constituting Multi-
tude: Founding a World Tribunal,” offers an ethnographic account of the 
WTI’s founding meeting in Istanbul. At question are the grounds of the tribu-
nal’s authority and the “sources” of its legitimacy. Based on my participation 
at this three- day encounter and a retrospective analysis of its meeting tran-
scripts, I examine the moment of self- authorization of a “world tribunal” to 
raise questions about the political constitution of global civil society— a 
 multitude— in action. I argue for the need to attend carefully to persistent 
tensions between legalist and political imaginaries that animate rival visions 
of global peace and justice.
In Chapter 2— “Whose Tribunal?”— I expand my analysis of the World 
Tribunal on Iraq comparatively and explore the human rights politics enacted 
by the Iraqi High Tribunal (which sentenced President Saddam Hussein of 
Iraq to execution) and the limited way in which Human Rights Watch criti-
cized this tribunal inaugurated by the United States in the aftermath of Iraq’s 
occupation. To ground the comparison, I provide an account of the WTI’s 
culminating session in Istanbul. Throughout this chapter, I pose a common 
set of questions with respect to both tribunals in order to reveal some of the 
perplexities they share. These perplexities emerge, I argue, on account of the 
contentious nexus between law and violence on the one hand, and the com-
petition between universal and national paradigms of justice on the other.
“Constituting Constitutions: The Fact of Iraqi Constitution, the Fatalism 
of Human Rights” is the third chapter, which reconstructs the ultimate contro-
versy among the global network of activists who created the World Tribunal 
on Iraq. The particular dispute I analyze was sparked in 2005 by a specific 
campaign of Amnesty International demanding a “human rights based con-
stitution in Iraq.” When some WTI activists wished to condemn Amnesty 
International for legitimating with this campaign an illegitimate constitutional 
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process initiated by the military occupation in Iraq, other tribunal activists 
disagreed with such a condemnation. Reconstructing this debate, I map its 
stakes along the contours of the political rivalry between “humanity” and “cit-
izenry” as constitutional subjects, as I continue to highlight disputes about the 
lawmaking capacity of violence.
In the fourth and last chapter, “ ‘Humanity Must Be Defended,’ ” I address 
liberal political visions that propose to institutionalize an allegedly egalitarian, 
novel, and superior form of cosmopolitan law in contradistinction to “classi-
cal” international law. Here, reflecting on a dramatic cross- examination at the 
WTI’s inaugurating session in Brussels, I analyze NATO’s 1999 military inter-
vention in Kosovo and the framework of the Responsibility to Protect doc-
trine to argue that the liberal endorsement of this “exceptional” title provides 
the proper context for assessing cosmopolitan responses to the occupation of 
Iraq. I then turn to the colonial origins and structures of international law to 
evaluate contemporary cosmopolitan aspirations in the field of international 
law, which were shared by many (but not all) activists and jurists affiliated 
with the World Tribunal on Iraq. Ultimately, contrary to most cosmopolitans, 
I argue that “law’s empire” is not an alternative to, but an articulation of “em-
pire’s law.” 
